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ABSTRACT
The main task of authoritarian elections is to guarantee the survival of the
regime. Achieving this goal, authoritarian rulers rely on authoritarian electoral
mobilization that is employed by political machines, targeted mostly on poor
and dependent voters. At the same time, since electoral autocracies permit
opposition parties, those voters, who avoid mobilization, are able to make a
choice between the government and the opposition. If they are dissatisfied
by their personal or social conditions, they are liable to engage in
‘performance voting’ and give their support to the opposition. In this article,
we examine how the two logics of ‘mobilized voting’ and ‘performance
voting’ relate to each other. The study is based on a large-N analysis of local
level variations in the electoral support of Russia’s three systemic opposition
parties in 2016 Duma elections, and a unique dataset comprised of electoral
and social-economic data, from local (municipal) units.
KEYWORDS Electoral authoritarianism; opposition; Russia; municipalities; mobilized and performance
voting
The main task of authoritarian elections is to guarantee the survival of the
regime. Achieving this goal, authoritarian rulers rely on authoritarian electoral
mobilization that is employed by political machines (Stokes 2005; Golosov
2013). One of the main target groups for political machines, are poor and
deprived areas, as poverty increases the demand for clientelistic exchange
and direct vote-buying. As a result, opposition parties perform better in the
territories with less favourable conditions for machine mobilization, such as
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in urban and wealthy areas with more educated populations (White 2020).
However, not all people are subjected to authoritarian mobilization. Since
electoral autocracies permit opposition parties, those voters, who are
outside the targeted mobilization groups, or who can avoid mobilization,
are able to make a choice between the government and the opposition.
Regardless of whether they do it rationally or expressively, voters blame
the incumbent party if they are dissatisfied by their personal or social situ-
ation. They engage in ‘performance voting’ and give their support to the
opposition (Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013). Consequently, from the per-
spective of ‘performance voting’, we can expect that the areas with an econ-
omic downturn are more likely to vote for the opposition parties. However, it
remains unclear how the two logics of ‘mobilized’ and ‘performance’ voting
relate to each other, thus a key aim of this research is to solve this puzzle.
In this study we examine local variations in electoral support for the oppo-
sition in the Russian Duma elections of 2016. In Russia, there exist three sys-
temic opposition parties – The Communist Party of the Russian Federation
(CPRF), The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia (JR).
All of these parties are ‘effectively controlled by the Kremlin and incorporated
into the formal and informal hierarchy of the Russia’s government’ (Gel’man
2008, 913), thus we might expect to find little policy differences between
them. Nonetheless, these parties have different historical roots and trajec-
tories, and it is possible to expect that the voters do not perceive them as
being identical. Consequently, the other puzzle of this study concerns the
extent to which these perceptions translate into territorial variations in elec-
toral support for each of these parties.
Whilst there have been a large number of studies of the Kremlin’s party of
power, United Russia (UR) (Reisinger and Moraski 2009, 2010; Panov and Ross
2013; Panov and Ross, 2019; White 2015, 2016; Saikkonen 2016; Ross and
Panov 2019), and White (2020) has provided an excellent account of the ter-
ritorial support for the CPRF, there have been no studies which have con-
ducted a comparative analysis of all three systemic opposition parties.
In this article, we seek to answer the questions using a unique dataset
comprising electoral and social-economic data, from local (municipal) units.
The local level provides more disaggregated data than the regional level
data, and it also substantially increases the number of observations, which
has undoubted advantages in large-N studies. Despite the fact, that collecting
local-level data in Russia is more problematic, a number of scholars have suc-
cessfully overcome such difficulties, in studies of authoritarian mobilization
(Saikkonen 2017), ethnic representation in the Duma (Goodnow and Moser
2012; White and Saikkonen 2016), the scope of electoral manipulation
(Goodnow, Moser, and Smith 2014; Moser and White 2017; Saikkonen and
White 2021), and, as noted above, the electoral performance of the CPRF
(White 2020). Our dataset, however, differs from previous studies, as it uses
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the most recent 2010 All-Russian Population Census, and the latest social and
economic data extracted from the Database of Indicators of Municipalities,
available on the Rosstat web-site (Federal State Statistic Service, rosstat.gov.ru).
Local-level analysis allows us to highlight the differences in voting for the
three systemic opposition parties and to expose how the two different logics
of voting relate to each other. Our study confirms statistically that in general,
rural and relatively poor areas with a higher proportion of non-Russians, give
support to the party of power, United Russia, which fully corresponds with
the authoritarian mobilization logic. However, when we examine the opposi-
tion parties individually, we find substantial differences in their support,
depending on the ethnic composition and the standard of living of the terri-
torial units. In particular, poorer areas tend to vote for the CPRF (but not for
the LDPR and JR); and a low share of non-Russians in a territorial unit benefits
the LDPR (but the CPRF and JR). Consequently, we find that both logics of
voting matter and complement each other.
The structure of our article is as follows. We begin with a brief review of the
main theoretical points important for the study of elections and opposition
parties in authoritarian regimes and apply them to Russia. Based on this dis-
cussion, we propose two set of hypotheses regarding voting for the systemic
opposition parties in general and for each party individually. This is followed
by a detailed account of the variables, indicators, and empirical data
employed in the study. Then we test our hypotheses with the empirical
data from the 2016 Duma elections and present the results. The conclusion
summarizes the study’s main findings.
Elections and opposition parties in authoritarian regimes
Recent research has stressed that elections and partisan legislatures play a
major positive role in stabilizing and bolstering autocracies. Electoral authori-
tarian regimes, such as Russia, which sanction the creation of multi-party leg-
islatures have been shown to be more stable and long lasting than regimes
which seek to rule through naked suppression (Levitsky and Way 2002; Sche-
dler 2006). Competitive elections in autocracies legitimate the system,manage
intra-elite conflicts, divide the opposition into systemic and non-systemic com-
ponents, and co-opt the former (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi and
Lust-Okar 2009; Ross 2018; Armstrong, Reuter, and Robertson 2020).
The main task of authoritarian elections is to guarantee the victory of the
ruling party, and the survival of the regime (Simpser 2013). Consequently,
authoritarian rulers rely on non-ideological and non-policy electoral mobiliz-
ation (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Such mobilization (‘mobilized voting’) is
employed by political machines (Stokes 2005; Golosov 2013). They use
numerous instruments aimed at ensuring the victory of an incumbent, on a
non-ideological / non-policy basis. The range of their activities includes
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clientelist exchanges, vote-buying, administrative pressure on voters, and so
forth (Stokes et al. 2013; Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2019; Hicken and Nathan
2020). Direct mobilization activity takes place at the lower levels, and it is well
known that lower authorities and lower-ranking officials are held directly
responsible to higher level officials, for the election results in their constitu-
encies (Ross 2007).
It has been argued that poor citizens are one of the most important target
groups for authoritarian mobilization (Magaloni 2006; Jensen and Justesen
2014; Frantz 2018). On the one hand, low-income people are more prone
to accept ‘awards in kind’ for their loyal voting. On the other hand, poor
people are more dependent on their ‘supervisors’ (bosses, patrons, employ-
ers, etc.) and are more vulnerable to administrative pressure. Moreover, the
level of poverty matters, not only from the view of individual voters, but
also from the perspective of the territorial units. Relatively poor arears are
more susceptible to political pressure which benefits the electoral support
of UR. In contrast, as White (2020, 393), 4) notes, ‘wealthier areas should
lean toward opposition parties because the local population should be less
dependent on goods distributed by the regime’.
At the same time, electoral authoritarian regimes permit opposition
parties to operate, provided that they do not threaten the survival of the
regime. Those voters, who are outside the targeted mobilization groups, or
who can avoid mobilization, are able to choose between the incumbent
‘party of power’ (UR), and the opposition. Consequently, in this case, we
can expect to find examples of ‘performance voting’. In those territorial
units, where people are dissatisfied by their current situation, they tend to
vote for the opposition parties to a greater extent. In other words, they
blame the party when things go wrong (Sirotkina and Zavadskaya 2020).
‘This follows the classic tradition of democratic theory, which understands
elections as a sanctioning device in which voters reward or punish incum-
bents on the basis of past performance’ (Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013,
116). Voters are more likely to ‘throw the rascals out’ when economic con-
ditions are getting worse and support them when times are good (Ibid).
Strictly speaking, performance voting concerns rational evaluation of past
policy performance, but many dissatisfied people will blame the government
and vote for the opposition expressively, and in large-N quantitative analyses,
it is not possible to distinguish rational and expressive motivations. Therefore,
in this study we include expressive voting, under the general category of ‘per-
formance voting’.
Also, citizens can vote for the opposition on the basis of their values and
ideological orientations (‘ideological voting’). Thus, for example, the values of
human rights and democracy can motivate voting against the party of power,
regardless of personal and socio-economic conditions. Furthermore, some
people make their decisions based on their attachment to a political party
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or specific party candidates (‘party identification voting’), though in Russia,
the number of ‘core voters’ is unlikely to be large, as it is argued that the
Russian party system is not a product of strong social cleavages (Hale 2006).1
In this study, we focus on the two contradictory forms of ‘mobilized’ and
‘performance’ voting, and we test the following competing hypothesis con-
cerning voting for opposition parties, as a whole.
H 1.1.1: The low level of well-being in a unit favours administrative mobilization
and impacts on the voting for opposition parties negatively.
H 1.1.2: The low level of well-being in a unit results in dissatisfaction with the
incumbent and impacts on the voting for opposition parties positively.
H 1.2.1.: Bad economic conditions in a unit increases poverty and impacts on
the voting for opposition parties negatively.
H 1.2.2: Bad economic conditions in a unit results in dissatisfaction with the
incumbent and impacts on the voting for opposition parties positively.
Furthermore, as has been demonstrated in previous studies, the effectiveness
of political machines, which employ authoritarian mobilization, is facilitated
by strong social networks, such as rural and ethnic networks, which enable
the regime to distribute awards in return for loyal voting, monitor possible
defections, put pressure on voters from their social environment, and so
forth. For that reason, regions with a higher share of non-Russians and
rural inhabitants, are more susceptible to regime mobilization and pressure
(Hale 2003; White 2015; Panov and Ross 2016; Frantz 2018). Consequently,
we would expect the following:
H 1.3: The share of rural dwellers in a unit impacts on the share of votes for
opposition parties negatively.
H 1.4: The share of non-Russians in a unit impacts on the share of votes for
opposition parties negatively.
The systemic opposition parties in Russia
The systemic opposition parties – the CPRF, LDPR, and JR – face a dilemma, as
they are often torn between their role as professed opponents of the regime,
whilst at the same time having to continually demonstrate their loyalty to the
Kremlin. If they are too loyal and acquiescent and make too many compro-
mises with the government, they risk weakening their electoral base and
losing the support of their rank-and-file members, but if they are too
radical in their opposition, they may be denied participation in the elections
and lose their spoils and privileges. Overall, all three of the systemic opposi-
tion parties may be defined as ‘parastatal’ parties, which largely operate
under the control of the Kremlin (March 2012, 251), and ‘pillars’ of the
REGIONAL & FEDERAL STUDIES 5
regime (Dollbaum 2017, 109). As Hutcheson and McAllister (2017, 477) note,
UR and the three opposition parties do not provide a full spectrum of policy
options.
They form a “cartel” that has very few real policy differences. As such, voters
casting their vote for one of these four parties were effectively choosing
between four within-system options with different emphases – like choosing
between shades of grey, rather than between black and white.
At the same time, according to Gel’man (2015, 177), in addition to ‘being
harshly coerced by the authorities’, the Russian systemic opposition has
‘been bitterly divided by internal contradictions, thus opening doors for
the Kremlin’s divide-and-rule tactics’. The leaders of the three systemic
parties have devoted much of their energies in the parliament to attacking
each other, rather than holding UR to account. Furthermore, there are
some important differences between these parties, first of all, in their
origins and trajectory of development.
The Communist Party is by far the largest of the three systemic opposition
parties (163,247 members on 1 Jan 2018). Being the CPSU successor party, it
inherited the strongest grassroots organization. The party participates in elec-
tions at all levels of the political system and in some regions, it shares impor-
tant legislative positions with UR. It has held seats in all 7 Duma’s, winning 42
seats in 2016, and it came second to United Russia in 34 of Russia’s 85 regions.
The LDPR, on the contrary, was created in the era of perestroika. In the very
first Duma elections in 1993 the party gained first place with 23% of the votes
but since then its electoral support has ranged from 5% to 15%. Alongside the
CPRF, it has held seats in all 7 Dumas, and it won 39 seats in the latest elec-
tions in 2016. Compared to 2011, its electoral results in 2016 improved mark-
edly in all but 14 regions, and it came second to United Russia in 39 regions.
Just Russia was created out of the merger of three other parties in 2006
(the national-populist Rodina, the left-leaning Pensioner’s Party and the cen-
trist Party of Life, with the addition of the People’s Party in 2007), and it has
held seats in the Duma since 2007. It is a spoiler party created by the Kremlin
to steal votes from both the Communists and the LDPR. However, in contrast
to CPRF, some leaders of Just Russia gave their support to the mass protest
movement in 2011 and 2012. For that reason, the party came under
extreme pressure from the Kremlin, and suffered ‘multiple splits and defec-
tions of sponsors’ (March 2015, 105). The dissident members were expelled,
and Mironov the head of the party, was forced to denounce the opposition
movement, and later he was removed from his post as chair of the Federation
Council. In 2016, JR gained 23 Duma seats. However, in 36 regions it gained
less than 5% of votes, and it took second place in only five regions.
All three opposition parties, if they want to maintain their seats in the
Duma, have to support the status quo, and generally toe the Kremlin line.
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However, the differences in their origin and trajectory, has had an influence
on the perceptions of these parties in the mass consciousness. According
to the 2012 Russian Election Studies Survey, voters view, ‘United Russia, as
primarily a right-oriented party, counterpoised to the CPRF’s leftism, with
the other two main parties falling more in the centre’ (Colton and Hale
2014, 13). On economic policy, the CPRF, is seen ‘as devoted to a return to
socialism’ whist the policies of JR and LDPR ‘were less clear to voters’ (Ibid).
The Survey also revealed differing perceptions on the parties’ stance on
foreign policy. Thus, United Russia ‘was identified with treating the West as
an ally while the CPRF and the LDPR were seen, as believing the West is
mainly a rival or enemy’ (Ibid). Undoubtedly, since the annexation of
Crimea in 2014, the Russian political landscape has changed; and all the sys-
temic parties have taken anti-Western positions. Nevertheless, we can expect
that the general views of the opposition parties which were expressed in the
Russian Election Studies Survey remain salient. Thus, the Communist Party is
still viewed as the most dissident and leftist of the three opposition parties.
The LDPR is ostensibly an ultra-right-wing party which disavows ‘both econ-
omic liberalism and communism’, and Just Russia ‘is ostensibly a left of centre
party and is perceived as the most systemic of the opposition parties’ (Reuter
2019).
Thus, we can expect that those members of the electorate who vote
against UR, make a choice based on these ordinal views.2 Since the CPRF is
conceived as a left-wing party, we would expect that it should be supported
to a greater extent in less wealthy areas. The LDPR, on the contrary, criticizes
Soviet rule; and the main focus of its rhetoric is the promotion of ‘Russianness’
in an ethnic sense. Therefore, we would expect that the party will be more
popular in territories with less share of non-Russians. Concerning JR, our
expectations are much less clear. As the party occupies a centre-left position,
and it stresses issues of social justice, the poorer members of electorate are
likely to sympathize with it, but it is constrained by the fact that, in contrast
to the CPRF and the LDPR, it is perceived as a party which was artificially
created by the Kremlin. However, as noted above, some leaders of JR partici-
pated in the 2011–12 protest movement in large cities. For these reasons, it
might be expected that JR is supported to a greater extent in urban areas.
Consequently, the second set of hypotheses is as follow:
H 2.1: The low level of well-being in a unit impacts on the share of votes for the
CPRF positively.
H 2.2: The high share of non-Russians in a unit impacts on the share of votes for
the LDPR negatively.
H 2.3: The high share of rural dwellers in a unit impacts on the share of votes for
JR negatively.
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Variables, indicators, data
Our dependent variables are the election results of the three opposition
parties taken together, and separately (percentage of votes), in the 2016
Duma election, in the municipalities that are the units of observation in
this study. Local-level data provides us with more disaggregated data and
enables us to generate more nuanced findings by increasing the number
of observations, and it also helps us to uncover some of the patterns that
may be hidden in the regional level data. We take the party list results of
the three parties in total, and also the individual results for each party. The
focus of our study is the 2016 Duma elections, which are the most recent par-
liamentarian elections. These elections took place in a fairly stable political
environment, and were conducted not long after the 2014 annexation of
Crimea, that consolidated the regime around the Kremlin. In this sense,
2016 is more appropriate for the study than, for instance, the 2011 Duma
elections which were held at a time of economic decline and rising political
dissatisfaction with the government, which resulted in protest voting, and
the rise of a mass opposition movement against the regime.
Weuse the official elections results3 of the ‘upper tier’of themunicipal units –
the municipal districts and city okrugs.4 Since Moscow and St. Petersburg have
special structures of local government, they are not included in the analysis;
Crimea and Sevastopol are also excluded, due to the very specific political situ-
ationwhichpertains in these regions, after their accession to Russia. In total,with
the exception ofMoscow, St. Petersburg, Crimea, and Sevastopol, we have 2326
local-level units of observation.
The list of independent variables follows from our hypothesis. The share of
non-Russians in the administrative units is taken from the official data of the
latest All-Russian Population Census (2010), and all other social and economic
variables are extracted from the Database of Indicators of Municipalities,
available on the Federal State Statistic Service (Rosstat) web-site. The share
of rural dwellers in a unit is calculated in percentages. For the measurement
of economic conditions in municipalities, we use the dynamics of the average
annual number of employees in a municipal unit. We count the percentage
growth in the number of employers in 2016 in comparison to 2013.
Whereas the positive values of this variable, indicates a positive trend in
the unit’s economy, negative values point to poor economic dynamics. The
level of well-being in a unit is measured using the average monthly salary
in a municipality. However, since the regions of the Russian Federation
vary greatly in commodity prices, the absolute value of the average
monthly salary is not a valid indicator, therefore, we weight it by the
average monthly salary in the respective regions and present it in percen-
tages. A weighted value of more than 100% indicates that a unit is wealthier
relative to its region; and a value less than 100%, on the contrary, indicates
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poorer municipal units. The information about the variables, indicators, and
sources is summarized in Table 1.
It is important to stress, that local-level electoral and social-economic stat-
istics are not always consistent. On the one hand, the data presented on the
Central Electoral Commission’s website, contains the elections results at the
level of the territorial election commissions (TECs). Usually, the boundaries
of the TECs coincide with municipal districts and city okrugs. However, in
large cities (as a rule, in regional centres) some TECs are created, therefore
we summarize the election results in these TECs. In very small local units (6
cases), on the contrary, TECs are not created (these units are attached to
the TECs of other local units), for that reason these units are excluded from
the analysis.
On the other hand, there are some problems with the quality of local social
/ economic statistics. For instance, in Russia there are approximately 40 so
called ‘closed municipal units’ which are absent in the official statistics.
Additionally, there are some gaps and unreliable information in the Database
of Indicators of Municipalities, therefore we have to exclude some regions
from the analysis (Buryatia, Ingushetia, and Mordovia). Also, as we use
multi-level regression analysis, three regions were excluded due to the
small number of municipal units (Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Jewish Auton-
omous Oblast’, Chukotka). As a result, the number of local units available for
the analysis is reduced to 2209 observations in 75 regions.




Percentage of votes for opposition
parties in total, and individually
The Russian Central Electoral Commission
Website (http://www.cikf.ru).
Non-Russians The share of non-Russians in the
population (2010, in per cent).
Collected and calculated by the authors on
the basis of the data of the All-Russian
Population Census 2010. (web-sites of the
regional branches of the Federal State
Statistic Service)
Rural The share of the rural population (2016,
in per cent)
Calculated by the authors on the basis of:
The Database of Indicators of
Municipalities (https://www.gks.ru/free_
doc/new_site/bd_munst/munst.htm)
Salary The average monthly salary in a
municipal unit divided by the average
monthly salary in the region
Calculated by the authors on the basis of:
Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-
ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2019 (Moskva:
Rosstat, 2019). Tables 4.5.
The Database of Indicators of
Municipalities (https://www.gks.ru/free_
doc/new_site/bd_munst/munst.htm)
Employment The percentage growth in the number
of employers in 2016 in comparison
to 2013
Calculated by the authors on the basis of:
The Database of Indicators of
Municipalities (https://www.gks.ru/free_
doc/new_site/bd_munst/munst.htm)
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The descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 illustrate how great the
differences are between municipalities, both in terms of their socio-economic
indicators and voting patterns. The range of the values for the election results
of the opposition parties is more than 60% at the local level. However, if we
take individual opposition parties, the range is smaller, but it varies for the
different opposition parties, and it is closely tied to the overall nationwide
results of the parties. The CPRF and the LDPR, which won approximately
13% of the votes, have the range 36% and 38% respectively. It is noteworthy,
that support for the LDPR is distributed more unevenly across the territory
than are the votes of the CPRF: the value of variance reaches 54%, while
the variance of the CPRF is only 32%. JR which won 6.2% of the votes demon-
strates a smaller range and variance. Nevertheless, one can see that they are
fairly popular in a number of individual municipalities; the maximum values
of JR are just under 30% (in Viluyskiy district in Yakutia and Kamenskiy district
in Altay kray).
The descriptive statistics also show huge variations in the social and econ-
omic indicators across the municipalities. The variations in the share of the
rural population are evident, due to the fact that there are both city okrugs
and rural districts in our sample; and variations in the share of non-Russians
are well-known, however such great variations in the values of economic indi-
cators are particularly noteworthy. In some municipal units (Kansk municipal
district in Krasnoyarskiy kray; Kudymkarsky municipal district in Permskiy kray,
etc.) the averagemonthly salary is almost two times lower than in the respect-
ive region, whereas in 7 units, on the contrary, is more than two times higher
(Lobnya in Moskovskaya oblast’, Novaya Zemlya district in Archangelskaya
oblast’, etc.). As for employment growth, the value of the mean is negative
(−9.01), which indicates rather poor economic performance on average,
especially due to the fact, that the values of the standard deviation are
fairly low (12.62). In other words, in the whole country the level of employ-
ment in 2016 decreased relative to 2013. However, we find more than 340
municipalities that demonstrate a growth in employment, including such
cases as Novaya Zemlya in Archangelsk oblast’, Selemdzhinskii district in
Amur oblast’, etc., where employment has doubled in recent years.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (N = 2209).
Mean Minimum Maximum Variance Standard deviation
Opposition results 34.34 0.14 60.77 150.79 12.28
CPRF results 13.83 0.00 36.61 31.95 5.65
LDPR results 15.17 0.00 38.09 54.16 7.36
JR results 5.34 0.00 30.75 18.60 4.31
Non-Russians 22.65 0.62 99.99 829.64 28.80
Rural dwellers 56.93 0.00 100.00 1376.97 37.11
Salary 90.75 54.08 224.23 439.06 20.95
Employment −9.01 −53.32 106.70 159.37 12.62
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Analysis and results
We need to employ multi-level regression, not simple OLS, since the data are
hierarchical (municipalities as the level 1, nested within regions as the level 2)
which violates the assumption of residuals independency. For the four
dependent variables (the three opposition parties overall – OPP, and separ-
ately – LD, CP, JR), we develop models with random intercepts, which
allow us to model the nested data more precisely. Using random intercepts
allows us to define to what extent the intercepts vary across regional units.
The results are presented in Table 3.
In general, we find evidence in favour of both logics of voting – ‘authori-
tarian mobilization’ and ‘peformance voting’. Thus, in all the models, ‘Employ-
ment’ has negative and statistically significant coefficients, consequently,
relatively good economic performance in a unit is unfavourable for the oppo-
sition parties. On the contrary, a 1% decrease in the number of employees in
2016 from those in 2013 leads to an increase in voting for the opposition by
0.05%. Here, we have an example of ‘peformance voting’, i.e. voters are prone
to blame the party of power for economic decline. Thus, of the two compet-
ing hypotheses, hypothesis H 1.2.2 is confirmed.
At the same time, in the OPP model, ‘Salary’ has a positive coefficient. At
the first glance, this is rather in line with the ‘authoritarian logic’: wealthier
units are more prone to vote for the opposition as they are less vulnerable
to administrative mobilization. However, the coefficients have a statistical
Table 3. Multi-level regression models with random intercepts (between regions) (N =
2209).
Dependent variable:
OPP LD CP JR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Russians −0.093*** −0.100*** −0.009 0.013***









Salary 0.007 0.006 −0.014*** 0.015***


















σ2 30.56 11.32 13.46 6.59
τ00 84.13 25.36 19.34 9.91
ICC 0.73 0.71 0.59 0.60
Observations 2209 2209 2209 2209
Log Likelihood −7085.143 −5987.117 −6158.109 −5372.936
Akaike Inf. Crit. 14,184.290 11,988.230 12,330.220 10,759.870
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 14,224.190 12,028.140 12,370.120 10,799.770
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.126 / 0.767 0.187 / 0.765 0.030 / 0.602 0.071 / 0.629
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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significance neither in the OPP, nor in the LDPR model. Only Just Russia
benefits in the better-of units. Moreover, in the CPRF model, ‘Salary’ has a
negative and statistically significant coefficient. If the average salary in the
municipality exceeds the average salary in the region by 1%, it reduces
voting for the CPRF by 0.014%. Consequently, here we have a much more
captivating picture, that reconciles both of the competing hypotheses H
1.1.1 and H 1.1.2. On the one hand, a lower level of well-being in a unit facili-
tates authoritarian mobilization and voting for the party of power, whilst a
higher level of well-being, on the contrary, favours the opposition (voting
for JR), as hypothesis H 1.1.1 posits. On the other hand, we find that those
poor people, who evade administrative pressure, express their dissatisfaction
by voting for the opposition (H 1.1.2), however not the opposition in general,
but specifically the CPRF.
Nevertheless, the ‘authoritarian logic of voting’ is clearly found in two of
the other variables. Here we almost fully confirm the hypotheses H 1.3 and
H 1.4. As was expected, ‘Rural dwellers’ has negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficients in all the models. The growth of the share of rural population
in a unit by 1% reduces voting for the opposition by 0.06%. The share on
‘Non-Russians’ has an even more significant negative impact – 0.09%.
However, in contrast to the situation in rural areas, the influence of ethnicity
is not uniform among the different systemic opposition parties. A higher
share of ethnic minorities in the population impacts negatively on voting
only for the LDPR, whereas in the JR model, it has a positive coefficient,
and in the CPRF model the coefficient is not significant.
Consequently, we find significant differences in voting for the three systemic
oppositionparties. ThisfindingconfirmshypothesisH2.1 that a low level ofwell-
being in a unit favours the CPRF. It is the only systemic opposition party which
has electoral benefits from relatively poor people, as it is still perceived as the
most important left-wing party in Russia. Hypothesis 2.2 is also confirmed. The
LDPR as a right-wing party, is the only systemic opposition party which is
clearly associated with ‘Russianess’, and one can see that increasing the share
of non-Russians by 1% reduces support for the LDPR by 0.1%. On the contrary,
Hypothesis 2.3 hasnotbeen fully confirmed.Althoughhigh sharesof rural dwell-
ers in a unit impactsnegativelyonvoting for JR,wefind the same for all theother
systemic opposition parties. At the same time, in comparisonwith the LDPR and
CPRF, JR has more support in the wealthier units. Although indirectly it may be
linked with the urban population, it is insufficient to confirm Hypothesis 2.3.
Additionally, in contract to other systemic opposition parties, the share of
non-Russians has a positive influence on voting for JR. In this sense JR is closer
to UR. One of the reasons for this is the origins of JR. In the late 2000s, when
JR was perceived as the second party of power, fairly strong regional branches
were established in some regions, including the ethnic republics (Yakutia, Chu-
vashiya), and they have remained in place.
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Furthermore, it has to be stressed that all the models demonstrate that
Russian regions do indeed vary greatly in their voting. The high values of
the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) in all the models, means that the
regions account for 73% of the variability of voting for the systemic oppo-
sition in general, and 60–70% of the variability of the voting for the sep-
arate parties. Cross-regional differences are clearly brought out in
Figures 1–4, which are based on the respective multi-level models and
indicate individual intercepts for the regions with 95% confidence
intervals.
The analysis of these plots uncovers some interesting findings. In general,
a majority of the regions show similar results of voting for the parties (the
middle part of the plots, that is the range from approximately ‘−5’ to ‘+5’
in the region-level intercepts), however in all the plots, there are two
groups of regions which deviate from the middle significantly, to the left
Figure 1. Voting for all three systemic opposition parties (OPP): individual intercepts for
the separate regions with 95% confidence intervals.
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side (relatively low voting for the party), and to the right side (high voting). It
is noteworthy, that the parties differ greatly in both the number of such
‘deviated regions’ and their lists.
The LDPR has the highest number of deviations in both sides, which once
again proves that support for the LDPR is distributed more unevenly across
the territory of the RF, than are the votes of the CPRF and the JR. As for
the list of the ‘deviations’, on the left side, we have some regions that are
common for all the opposition parties – Dagestan, Chechnya, Tuva, Tatarstan,
Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kemerovo. This is not surprising, as all these are
regions with strong authoritarian rule; and they ensure extra-ordinal voting
for United Russia. At the same time, there are some important differences.
Thus, the other authoritarian regions, North Ossetiya and Kabardino-Balkar-
iya, are situated on the right side only in the plots of LDPR and JR, but
they are on the left side in the CPRF’s plot. This means that the CPRF has rela-
tively high levels of support in these regions.
Figure 2. Voting for the LDPR: individual intercepts for the separate regions with 95%
confidence intervals.
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Moreover, on the right side of the ‘deviations’ (the most favourite regions
for the parties) there are no coincidences at all. Each systemic opposition
party has its ‘own’ most beneficial regions. For the LDPR, these are basically
the Siberian and Far Eastern areas, such as Amur, Zabaikal’skii kray, Khabar-
ovsk, etc. These regions are well known as the territories that consider them-
selves as ‘outposts of Russia’ and at the same time experience feelings of
abandonment, and resentment towards Moscow. The recent history of the
victory of the LDPR candidate Sergei Furgal in the Khabarovsk gubernatorial
election, and the reaction to his subsequent arrest, demonstrate that the high
results of the LDPR in these regions are not an accident.
The list of regions, where the CPRF has the highest levels of support,
includes Irkutsk and Khakasiya. Again, these are the regions where the
CPRF’s candidates won the gubernatorial elections. The party is also popular
in Marii El, Omsk, Orenburg, Altay republic, Kostroma, and, as noted above
in North Ossetiya and Kabardino-Balkariya. Consequently, in contrast to the
Figure 3. Voting for the CPRF: individual intercepts for the separate regions with 95%
confidence intervals.
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LDPR, support for the CPRF is not localized geographically. It is possibly to
explain such a dispersed distribution by the fact that the party has traditionally
had fairly strong regional branches and personal leaders in these regions.
The same may be said for JR’s ‘favourable regions’: Yakutiya, Chelyabinsk,
Astrakhan, Altay krai, and Sverdlovsk Oblast. Support for JR in these areas is
clearly grounded on the personal quality and popularity of its regional
leaders: Oleg Shein in Astrakhan, Valerii Gartung in Chelyabinsk, Fedot
Tumusov in Yakutia, and so forth.
As there are high levels of cross-regional variations in voting for the sys-
temic opposition parties, uncertainty arises as to whether regional differences
have influenced our results. Therefore, to check the robustness of our infer-
ences, we run our baseline models with some predictors concerning the
regional level. We add such variables as ‘Regional poverty’ (the per cent of
the population with incomes below the subsistence minimum in 2016),
‘GRP per capita (log)’, and ‘Regional transfers’ (the per cent of federal
Figure 4. Voting for JR: individual intercepts for the separate regions with 95% confi-
dence intervals.
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non-repayable transfers in a unit’s budget in 2016).5 The results of robustness
check presented in Table 4 show that all the coefficients of the baseline
models remain almost the same, which lends robustness to our findings.
Additionally, one can see that the level of poverty in the regions increases
the voting for LDPR and CPRF, whereas the degree of financial dependence of
regions from federal transfers decreases the voting for them. Both outcomes
are in line with the ‘authoritarian logic of voting’. Only Just Russia is out of
step here, as the values of its coefficients are not statistically significant.
Also, noteworthy, is the fact that the ‘GRP per capita (log)’ influences the
voting for CPRF and LDPR in the opposite direction. Indeed, whilst LDPR is
especially popular in Siberian and the Far Eastern regions, which are rich in
minerals, and consequently have a high value of GRP per capita, the CPRF
is supported more in the regions with weak economies.
Conclusion
Our analysis confirms the hypothesis, that in spite of the fact, that all three
systemic opposition parties are ‘pillars’ of the regime, there are some
Table 4. Robustness check: multi-level regression models with regional predictors (N =
2209).
Dependent variable:
OPP LD CP JR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Russians −0.091*** −0.099*** −0.008 0.015***









Salary 0.007 0.006 −0.014*** 0.015***









Regional poverty 0.642* 0.364** 0.232* 0.049
(0.261) (0.147) (0.125) (0.096)
GRP per capita (log) −0.093 6.723** −6.633* −0.128









Constant 36.515 −22.684 52.809*** 6.003
(30.941) (17.450) (15.183) (11.455)
Random Effects
σ2 30.56 11.32 13.46 6.59
τ00 13.40 23.24 17.26 9.90
ICC 0.71 0.67 0.56 0.60
Observations 2209 2209 2209 2209
Log Likelihood −7075.323 −5979.776 −6154.399 −5373.977
Akaike Inf. Crit. 14,176.650 11,979.550 12,328.800 10,767.950
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 14,233.650 12,036.550 12,385.800 10,824.960
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.268 / 0.755 0.336 / 0.752 0. 103 / 0.607 0.094 / 0.635
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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substantial differences between their supporters. The lower the level of well-
being in an administrative unit is beneficial mostly for the CPRF. In contrast to
the LDPR and JR, the CPRF is still conceived as a left-wing party which defends
poor people. The LDPR is perceived as a rather right-wing party, clearly
associated with identity politics and ‘Russianess’; and it is the only systemic
opposition party which is evidently supported in the units with lower
shares of ethnic minorities. Our study also demonstrates, that besides the
social and economic features of municipal units, cross-regional differences
also have great importance. Liberal democrats are mostly supported in the
Siberian and Far Eastern areas, where sentiments such as ‘we are the
outpost of Russia’ are commonplace, and resentment towards Moscow is
widespread. Cross-regional variations in voting for the Communist party
are weaker and can be explained more by the quality of the party leadership
and the party’s historical roots. As for voting for JR, we find that the impact of
the social and economic features of municipalities is rather blurred. Electoral
support for Just Russia is grounded much more on the personal qualities of
the party leaders in the administrative units.
Differences in voting for the three systemic opposition parties allows us to
highlight the ways in which ‘mobilized’ and ‘performance voting’ relate to
each other. Our study confirms a high degree of authoritarian mobilization
that is facilitated by dense ethnic and rural networks and is more successful
in poorer areas. At the same time, we find that a number of people cast their
votes in response to the general economic dynamics in their administrative
units. This point is in line with ‘performance voting’, i.e. voters blame the
party of power for their poor conditions, both personal and social. Specifi-
cally, the lower the level of well-being in a unit, the more people vote for
opposition parties, however not for the opposition in general, but for the
CPRF. This confirms the fact that a significant part of the electorate, makes
a choice between the opposition parties. As a result, the low level of well-
being in a unit facilitates not only authoritarian mobilization in favour of
UR, but also voting for the CPRF. Consequently, our study proves empirically
that the two logics of voting do not contradict each other but are
complementary.
Notes
1. Thus, for example, Hutcheson and McAllister (2017, 460) in their 2016 Survey
found that just 27% of respondents, identified with a particular party. Likewise,
Colton and Hale (2014, 16) in their 2012 Russian Election Studies Survey, found
that approximately one third of the respondents could be defined as having,
what they term a ‘transitional partisanship’ with UR. This is a much weaker
and less stable relationship, than the classic form of party identification. For
the opposition parties, just 3% were transitional partisans of JR and LDPR,
and 9% held this weaker form of party identification for the CPRF.
18 P. PANOV AND C. ROSS
2. We realize that these are not the only incentives. Some voters cast their votes
on the basis of a fairly strong ‘party identification’, others may vote rationally
and ‘strategically’, for instance, in the case of ‘smart voting’ promoted by Naval’-
nyi (Turchenko and Golosov 2021), and so forth. However, generally, for most
ordinary voters, it appears to be reasonable to focus on their conventional
and ordinal perceptions.
3. It should be noted that some of the official election results are falsified
(Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin 2009; Goodnow, Moser, and Smith 2014;
Harvey 2016; Moser and White 2017; Saikkonen and White 2021). However,
we have not been able to take this into account in this study as it is extremely
difficult to measure the levels of fraud in all of the municipalities and to verify
the accuracy of the results.
4. Besides municipal districts and city okrugs, there were also nearly 20,000 small
municipalities of ‘lower tire’ (city settlements and rural settlements) that are
parts of municipal districts.
5. All the data are extracted from: Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie Poka-
zateli 2019 (Moskva: Rosstat, 2019).
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